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Europe Undivided and The Enlargement of the European Union present contrasting, 
but complementary, attempts to integrate the compartmentalised literatures on post-
communist politics, democratisation and European integration. Vachudova compares 
six Central and Eastern European states, which initially took divergent paths after 
1989. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Vachudova argues, followed a 
‘liberal’ pattern of change characterised by open political competition and alternation 
between left and right, extensive marketisation and a broadly effective rule of law.  
‘Liberal’ patterns were produced, where strong opposition elites existed under 
communism capable of challenging communist elites in 1989 and defeating  them in 
at the polls. Often, as Poland and Hungary, this was a consequence of communist 
regimes’ weakness or reformism, which also laid the basis for these ruling parties to 
transform into credible social democratic parties after 1989.  Such post-communist 
centre-left groups provided stiff competition for the parties of ex-opposition right and 
later formed responsible centre-left government that kept reform on track. Where 
Communists remained hardline, as in the Czech Republic, the emergence of a strong 
centre-left was delayed. Here the ex-opposition liberal right succumbed to clientelism 
due to lack of effective early opposition, despite the impeccable democratic 
credentials of the dissidents leaders of the 1989 revolution. Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania, by contrast, initially became ‘illiberal democracies’, where used 
clientelism, economic populism, media domination and scapegoating of national 
minorities to maintain their hold on power. Here strong opposition elites were weak or 
absent in 1989, transition took the form of a ‘pre-emptive strike’ by nomenklatura 
factions, as in Bulgaria and Romania, or was rapidly captured by nationalist forces 
with similarly illiberal, rent-seeking strategies, as in Slovakia 
 
Vachudova then attempts to assess the leverage of the EU on CEE democratisation. 
She distinguishes ‘passive leverage’ exercised by the EU in CEE in early 1990s by 
virtue of its existence and the possibility of enlargement, and the ‘active leverage’ 
based on explicit conditionalities of the accession process of late-1990s. Such 
leverage, she claims, although developed incrementally and accidently, was uniquely 
effective because accession was a rule-based process using objective criteria backed 
by strict monitoring and enforcement. Given the lack of feasible alternatives and the 
unequal nature of EU-CEE association agreements, the geo-political and economic 
incentives for CEE states to seek full EU membership seemed uniform and 
overwhelming However, CEE elites responded quite differently. In ‘liberal’ states, 
Vachudova suggests, EU leverage largely reinforced domestic reforms which were 
already converging with the acquis. However, ruling elites in illiberal pattern states, 
she claims, played a game of ‘diplomatic abitrage’, outwardly orienting foreign policy 
towards EU membership, whilst blocking or distorting the domestic reforms that and 
seeking to circumvent active leverage through partial adoption or non-implementation 
of the acquis. In the end, she claims, it was the EU’s ‘active leverage’ on opposition 
and civic forces in ‘illiberal states’, which proved decisive. The EU provided 
oppositions with a symbolic focus for action, political education and aid as well as 
highlighting illiberal regimes’ failures and inconsistencies. This enabled liberal, pro-
Western coalitions to win a series of critical elections in the late 1990s, breaking open 
semi-competitive political systems, kick-starting liberal reform and forcing illiberal 
ruling parties to adapt to liberal free markets, liberal democracy and European 
integration.  
  
Vachudova rejects arguments that accession leverage devalued democracy in CEE by 
bypassing domestic institutions, imposing West European models or emptying left-
right competition of content. The EU, she notes, lacked specific policy models in 
many areas. Moreover, CEE national institutions were established in CEE by the mid-
1990s and in the accession process, as in the EU itself, substantial areas, such as 
taxation and welfare, remain the responsibility of national governments. Such 
diversity is explored in Jacoby’s Enlargement of the EU, which, in fact, examines 
only the influence of Western models on policy and institutional reform in CEE since 
1989.  Most of the book presents a paired comparison of  Hungary and the Czech 
Republic supplemented by a briefer discussion of Poland, Ukraine, Sweden and 
Bulgaria to test findings against cases, which vary by size, geo-politics, economic 
development and imperial legacy. However, Jacoby argues, given the standard set of 
EU and NATO conditionalties applied across CEE, significant variation really occurs 
not between national cases but across policy areas. He studies institutional reform in 
five policy areas subject to varying levels of EU or NATO conditionality: health, 
regional policy, civilian control of the military, consumer protection and agriculture. 
Jacoby finds models, which suggest that copies of Western models were 
straightforwardly transplanted or imposed, oversimplistic.  Instead he identifies 
multiple and changing forms of emulation (often within the same policy area): simple 
copying (a rare occurrence), the use of approximate templates by CEE actors, the 
setting of minimum thresholds by the West and last minute institutional ‘patching’ to 
meet specific conditionalities. Forms of emulation depended upon the specificity of 
Western requirements in any given area and the precision with which local elites 
wished emulate foreign models.  
 
Outcomes of reform depended upon the strength of domestic actors and density of 
rules in any given policy area. Where domestic actors were well established and the 
acquis dense (as in agriculture), the area became political battleground. Conversely, 
when strong domestic actors did not face a sizeable acquis (as in healthcare), a 
process of genuine learning occurred. Where the acquis was specific, but domestic 
interests weak or non-existent (as with regionalisation), the result was institutional 
‘scaffolding’ with few actors to populate it and uncertainty as to whether sturdier 
structures would develop. Finally, where both the acquis and domestic actors were 
relatively weakly developed (as with consumer protection), isolated pioneering 
institution-building by new domestic policy entrepreneurs (‘homesteading’) ensues. 
Like Vachudova, Jacoby stresses, that what matters is the interaction of domestic and 
external forces and stresses the role of domestic actors as vectors for external 
influence. In contrast to Vachudova’s essentially rationalist approach, however, 
Jacoby sees the use of models as a form of ‘embedded rationality’ by actors, facing 
cognitive, time and resource constraints as well as external leverage. Perhaps, for this 
reason, his analysis, although compatible with the passive and active leverage periods 
of Vachudova, gives more weight to domestic actors as key catalysts for change. 
 
 
The grand theory of Undivided Europe inevitably also leaves loose ends. Its case for 
active leverage (and against domestic dynamics) seems overstressed. As Ukraine’s 
‘Orange Revolution’ suggests, societal discontent over economic stagnation and 
blatant political manipulation combined the ‘passive leverage’ of an enlarged EU and 
target aid to opposition forces can topple even entrenched semi-authoritarians. 
Moreover, on this and the book’s own evidence from CEE, political and economic 
rent-seeking seems a more widespread tool of ‘illiberal democracy’, than nationalism.  
Here, the absence of large national minorities in the three ‘liberal’ states makes it 
impossible to judge how far liberal elites’ values would lead them to resist nationalist 
temptations. The inclusion of Estonia or Latvia, which combine opposition-led 
transition and restive Russophone minorities, would have perhaps sharpened the 
analysis here. Clientelism too is perhaps best seen not just as a strategy of rent-
seeking baddies, but a political fact of life. Liberal, pro-Western elites too often need 
to build clientelistic networks when in office. Given this, the notion that polarised 
two-bloc politics – supplemented by the bureaucratic oversight of the European 
Commission - can substitute for weak civil societies and strong state institutions 
seems more questionable.  
 
Overall, Undivided Europe’s - synthesis of insights from a range of literatures into a 
coherent analysis is a is clearly ground-breaking. Despite, or perhaps because of, its 
trail of unanswered questions- it is likely to be a landmark book in debates on 
transition and integration for some time. Jacoby’s book is a narrower, but untidier 
work. A gratuitous chapter attempting to piggyback grand theoretical synthesis of the 
rationalist, historical and sociological branches of ‘new institutionalisms’ detracts Its 
fine grain, open-ended analysis of policy emulation. The book’s focus on policy, 
rather regime questions also suggests that it may be likely to gain a smaller immediate 
readership among democratisation scholars than Vachudova’s. Nevertheless, the 
book’s underlying originality and relevance to research on democracy in post-
enlargement CEE, where accession leverage will largely be a thing of the past, should 
not be overlooked.  
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